Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1982

State of Utah v. Robert Reedy, Jr. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
G. Fred Metos; Attorney for Appellant;
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Reedy, No. 18082 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2700

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

ROBERT REEDY, JR.,

Case No. 18082

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated Robbery,
a felony of the Second Degree in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
David B. Dee, Judge, presiding.

G. FRED METOS
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

F ~ l ED
DEC ~ 8 1982
~..-..···---- .... · · -

-

·------·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Cler~ Su;:..;:;r.1.~
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

........ ,-,.-""1--;,.,,;..:,

Cci;.::-r. Ubh

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

ROBERT REEDY, JR.,

Case No. 18082

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated Robbery,
a felony of the Second Degree in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
David B. Dee, Judge, presiding.

G. FRED METOS
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE . . . . . . . .

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT . . . . . . . . . . . 1
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT COr1MITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR
BY REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION ON THE NATURE OF AND REQUIREMENTS
FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE . . . . 2
CONCLUSION . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . 17

CASES CITED
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E. 2d 889 (Mass.
1979) • • e •
e

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 293 (1967)

.12

o

. . 9

Gregory v. United States, 369 F. 2d 185 (1966) .

9

Macklin v. United States, 409 F.2d 174 (1969) .

.9

McKenzie v. United States, 126 F.2d 533 (1942)

. 9

Neil v. Biggers, 490 U.S. 188 (1972)

.11

People v. Guzman, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69, 47 Cal. App.
3 d 3 8 0 , (Ca 1. App 1 . 19 7 5) . . . . . . . . . . 12
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) . . . 6,7
State v. Benjamin, 363 A. Zd 762 (Conn. 1976)

. 12

State v. Calia, 514 P.2d 1354 (Or. App., 1973) cert.
den. 417 U.S. 917 (1974) . . .
. . . . . 12
State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d 269, 421 N.E. 2d
157 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982)

. . 9,12,13

State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Ut. 1980) .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

.13,14

(CONTINUED)

PAGE

State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Ut .· 1977)
State v. Motes, 215 S.E. 2d 190 (S.C. 1975)

. . . . .
. . . . .

15
12

. . .

State v. Payne, 280 S.E. 2d 72 (W. Va. 1981)

12,16

. . . .

State v. Ponds, 227 Kan. 627, 608 P.2d 946

11

State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979)

7

State v. Ouick, 229 Kan. 117, 621 P.2d 997 (1981)

.7

State v. Schaffer, 683 P.2d 1185 (Ut. 1981)
State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Ut. 1981)

.

.13

. . . .14
(1931) . . . 14

. .

State v. Stenback, 78 u. 350, 2 P.2d 1050

.

. . . . 14,15
State v. Warren, 635 p. 2d 1263 (Kan. 1981) . . .
. 7,8,9,10,ll,13
State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Ut. 1977) . . . . . . . .14
Stovall v. Denno., 388 U.S. 293 ( 196 7) . . • . . . . . 9
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694 (Ut. 1980)

United States v. Barber, 412 F.2d 517 (3rd Cir. 1971). 5,6
United States v. Cueto, 628 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1980) .12,16
United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1976)
cert. den. 429 U.S. 1099 (1977) . . . . . .

12

United States v. Fernandez, 456 F.2d 638 (2nd Cir.
. . . . . . . . . . .
1972) . . . . . .

12

United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975). 12
United States v. Holly, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1974)

.

12

United States v. Kavanaugh, 572 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978) .12
United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.) cert.
den. 426 U.S. 908 (1976) . . • . . . . . . . . . 12
United States v. O'Neal, 496 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1974). 12
United States v. Telfaire, 469 ·F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir.
1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

9,12

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
PAGE
Buckhout, Determinants of Evewitness Performance on a
.
Lineup, 1974 Bull. P~ychonomic Soc'y. 191 . . . . 4
Buckhout, Eyewitness Identification and Psychology in
the Courtroom, Crim. Def., Sept.-Oct. (1977) . . 4
Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, Scientific Am.
(Dec. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Did
. . 4

Due Process Standards for the Admissibilit of E ewitness
Identi ication Evidence, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 4 1
(1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental Studies of Face
Identification, 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977) . 4

E ewitness Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses,
7 No . Ky. L. Rev. 0 7 ( 19 8 0) . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Frankfurter, The Trial of Sacco and Vanzetti . . . . . . 4
Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification:
The Gap From Wade to Kirby, 121 U.Pa. L. Rev. 1079
(1973) . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
. .4
Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Luce, The Neglected Dimension in Eyewitness Identification,
Crim. Def., May-June (1977) .~ . . . . . .
. . 4
Singer, Public Defender Sourcebook, (1976) . . . . . . . 4
Stewart, Perception,. Memory and Hearsay: A Criticism
of Present Law and the Pro osed Federal Rules of
Evi ence, 970 Utah Law Review 1 . . . . . . . . . 5
Tyrrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness Credibility: Adjusting
the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala. Law 563
(1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Use of Evewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal
Trials , 21 Crim. L. Q. 3 61 ( 19 7 9) . . . . . . . . . 4
Yarmey, The Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony, (1979) . 4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iii

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

v.
ROBERT REEDY, JR.

Case No. 18082

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Robert Reedy, Jr., appeals from a conviction
and judgment of Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the Second Degree,
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Robert Reedy, Jr. was charged with Aggravated
Robbery, a felony of the First Degree in violation of Title
76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended).
Appellant was convicted as charged in a jury trial and was sentenced
to incarceration at the Utah State Prison pursuant to Title

76, Chapter 3, Section 402, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended),
for the indeterminate term as provided by law for a felony of
the Second-Degree.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have the conviction and judgment
rendered below reversed and to have the case remanded to the
Third Judicial District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 28, 1980, between 8:15 and 8:30 a.m. two men
approached John Palmer, an attendant at a service station located
at 200 West on 1300 South.

(T. 9-10)

They asked for change

for a dollar and went to the coke machine.

(T. 10-11)

The

two returned to the cashier's window and pointed a gun through
the face hole at Mr. Palmer and demanded the money from the
till.

(T. 11)

On July 10, 1980, Mr. Palmer identified a photograph

of the appellant as the person who held the gun during the course
of the robbery.

(T. 16, 37-38)

However, no identification

of the appellant was made in court by Mr. Palmer.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CO:MMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY
REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED

INSTRUCTION ON THE NATURE OF AND REQUIREMENTS
FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE.
The defense raised at trial was that the appellant was

not the person who committed the aggravated robbery which was
alleged in the Information.

The only identification made of

the a?µellant by Mr. Palmer was from a photograohic array nearly
two weeks after the incident.

As a oart of his defense, appellant

requested an instruction which described the nature and dangers
inherent in identification evidence, some factors to consider in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

assessing the value of identification evidence and the burden
of proof with respect to the defense.

1.

(R. 66-67) 1 .

That Instruction provided:

INSTRUCTION NO.
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or
impression by the witness. In this case its value depends on
the opportunity the witness had to observe whether or-not the
defendant was the person who committed the aggravated robbery of
John Glen Palmer on June 28," 1980, and to make a reliable identification
later.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, you
should consider the following:
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity and an
adequate opportunity to observe the of fender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the
person at the time will be affected by such matters as how long or
short a time was available, how far or close the witness was from the
offender, how good were lighting conditions, whether the witness had
had occasion to see or know the person in the past .
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification made by that
witness subsequent to the event was A. nroduct of his or her own
recollection? - You may take into account both the strength of the
identification, and the circumstances under which the identification
was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced by
the circumstances under which the defendant was Presented to him for
identification, you should scrutinize the identification with great
care. You may also consider the length of time that lapsed between
the occurrence of the crime and the next opportunity of the witness to
see defendant, as a factor bea~ing on the realiability of the
identification.
(3) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each
identification witness in the same way as any other witness, consider
whether he is truthful, and consider whether he had the capacity and
opportunity to make a realiable observation on the matter covered in
his testimony.
The burden of proof on the State extends to every element of
the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is such an element.
The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Robert Reedy, Jr.,
was the pernetrator of the offense in question in this case. If
after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as to the
accuracy of the· identification, you must find the defendant not guilty.
(R. 66-67).
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The trial court refused to give the instruction and exception
was taken.

(Supplemental Transcript p. 3)

The dangers inherent in eyewitness identification evidence
have been the subject of discussion for many years.

In an oft-

quoted passage, the late Felix Frankfurter, former United States
Supreme Court Justice observed:
What is the worth of identification testimony
even when uncontradicted? The identification of
strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards
of such testimony are established by a formidable
number of instances in the records of English and
American trials. These instances are recent -not due to the brutalities of ancient criminal
procedure.
. ..
Evidence as to identity based on personal
impressions, however bona fide, is perhaps of all
classes of evidence the least to be relied upon,
and therefore, unless supported by other facts,
an unsafe basis. for the verdict of a jury. Frankfurter,
The Trial of Sacco and Vanzetti.
The unreliability of eyewitness identification has been
well documented in the literature, and numerous law review articles
. recent years. 2
.
on t h e sub.Ject in
h ave b een written

The commentators

of Eyewitness Identi ication, 2 Stan. L.
Rev. 969 (1977); Due Process Standards for the Admissibilit
of Eyewitness Identi ication Evi ence, 2 Kan. L. Rev.
( 978);
Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Flaws and Defenses, 7 No.
Ky. L. Rev. 407 (1980); Ellis, Davies, Shepherd, Experimental
Studies of Face Identification 3 Nat. J. Crim. Def. 219 (1977);
Use of E ewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials,
Crim. L.Q. 3
( 97).
Lotus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979);
Public Defender Sourcebook, pp. 251-57 (S. Singer, ed. 1976);
Yarmey,
The Ps cho1o
of E ewitness Testimon (1979); Buckhout,
Determinants o E ewitness Per ormance on a Lineu , 1974 Bull.
Psychonomic Soc y 9 ; Buckhout, Eyewitness I entication and
Ps~chology in the Courtroom, Crim. Def., Sept.-Oct. 1977, at
5- ; Buckhout, Eyewintess Testimony, Scientific Am., Dec. 1974,
at 23; Ellis, Davies & Shephera, Experimental Studies of Face
Identification, Nat'l J. Crim. Def. 219 (l977); Levine & Tapp,
The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from Wade
the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(1973);
Luce,
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,

note that reasons for this unreliability are found in the problems
that are associated with human perception and memory, both of
which play a vital role in eyewitness identification.

A lengthy

discussion of those problems are found in a law review article
dealing with the problemsi of perception and memory which are
associated with hearsay testimony. 3

With respect to those issues

the author noted:
At a basic level, perception is determined
by objective structural factors such as the nature
of the stimulus, the impact of the stimulus on
the sense organs according to various physical
laws, the operation of the afferent neural pathways
from the sense organs to the brain, and the cortical
projection or reconstruction of the stimulus. However,
the neurological system operates to transduce physical
energy into a sensation, it is clear that interpretation
is required to transform sensation into meaning.

*

*

In organizing raw sensory input, the central
nervous system is not a photographic recorder .
. . . Injury, pathology, drugs, youth, and senility
can seriously impair the accuracy of these processes.
1970 Utah Law Rev. at 9.
In United States v. Barber, 412 F.2d 517 (3rd

Ci~.

1971),

the court gave a similar description of the processes involved
in human observation, perception and memory.

It then went on

to state, with respect to eyewitness identification,

2. (continued) Dimension in Eyewitness Identificat~on, Crim.
Def., May-June 1977, at 5-8; Tyrrell & Cunningham, Eyewitness
Credibility: Adjusting the Sights of the Judiciary, 37 Ala.
Law. 563, 575-85 (1976).
3. Stewart, Perception, Memory and Hearsay: A Criticisra of
Present Law and the Pronosed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970
Utah Law Rev. 1.
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Eyewitness identification testimony, therefore,
is an expression of a belief or impression by the
witness. If there is a high degree of precision
and certai~ty in his expression, which is consistent
with any prior statements and unshaken on crossexamination, the statement of the witness may be
regarded as a statement of fact. If certainty
is lacking, the expression is deemed to possess
an evidentiary quality of inferior rank. Thus,
where the circumstances surroudning the criminal
act gave limited opportunity for observation or
utilization of the sensory perception, or where
uncertainty is expressed by the witness himself,
or exposed by a past history of the witness' statements
or demonstrated by cross-examination, the statement
of identity should be considered as only an expression
of opinion and should be accompanied by appropriate
instructions as to its sufficiency and weight.
To be sure, the courts have been generous in the
admission of eyewitness identification in order
to permit the jury to make its own assessment.
The emphasis has been on inclusion of evidence,
rather than exclusion; on credibility, rather than
admissibility. [footnotes omitted] 412 F.2d at
527.
In this case, the only identification evidence that was
produced was that of the appellant's photogra?h being picked
out of a group of six pictures.

This identification did not

occur until nearly twelve days after the robbery occurred.

In

Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a photographic
array was impermissibly suggestive in violation of the petitioner's
right to Due Process of Law.

In doing so, the court discussed

the dangers associated with the use of photographic identifications,
stating,
It must be recognized that improper employment
of photographs by police may sometimes cause witnesses
to err in identifying criminals. A witness may
have obtained only a brief glimpse of a criminal,
or may have seen him under poor conditions. Even
if the ?Olice subsequently follow the most correct
photo~raphic identification procedures and show
him the pictures of a nuo.ber of individuals without
indicating whom they suspect, there is some danger
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services
and Technology
administered
by the Utah State Library.
that the witness
may
make Act,an
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This danger will be increased if the police desplay
to the witness only the picture of a single individual
who generally resembles the person he saw, or if
th:y show him the pictures of several persons among
which the photograph of a single such individual
recurs or is in some way emphasized. [footnote
omitted] 390 U.S. at 383.
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in State v. Warren, 635

P.2d 1263 (Kan. 1981), discussed those general problems at length
which are associated with the use of evewitr.ess identification evidence .
.I

.

The court then took note of the particular problems that arise
in the courtroom with .that evidence.

In spite of the great volume of articles on
the subject of eyewitness testimony by legal writers
and the great deal of scientific research by psychologists
in recent years, the courts in this country have
been slow to take the problem seriously and, until
recently, have not taken effective steps to confront
it. The trouble is that many judges have assumed
that an "eyeball" witness, who identifies the accused
as the criminal, is the most reliable of witnesses,
and, if there are any questions a:out the identification,
the jurors, in their wisdom, are fully capable
of determining the credibility of the witness without
special instructions from the court. Yet cases
of mistaken identification are not infreauent and
the problem of misidentification has not.been alleviated.
We note, for example, a 1979 unreported prosecution
in Wilmington, Delaware, against Rev. Bernard T.
Pagano, a Roman Catholic priest, accused of robbing
six Delaware stores in the winter of 1978. At
the trial, he was falsely identified by several
state witnesses as the robber. After the State
rested its case, the prosecution was dismissed
on motion of the State because another man confessed
to the crime. Closer to home is the case of Ronald
Quick, who was twice tried and convicted of aggravated
robbery of a liquor store in Hutchinson. At both
trials two eyewitnesses positively identified defendant
as the perpetrator of the crime. These two convictions
were reversed for trial errors in State v. Quick,
226 Kan. 308, 597 P~2d 1108 (1979) and 229 Kan.
117, 621 P.2d 997 (1981). The case was dismissed
by the State during the third trial after another
man, who looked like the defendant, confessed to
the crime.
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The Kansas procedure does provide certain
safeguards to Prevent the conviction of an innocent
accused on the·- basis of unreliable eyewitness identification.
Our trial courts have the power to suonress eyewitness
testimony, if the eyewitness identification procedure
rendered the testimony unreliable. Cross-exaI!linatio.n
and argument by defense counsel afford some protection.
Unfortunately, these procedures have not solved
the problem. Able defense counsel have attempted
to combat unreliable eyewitness identification
by two additional methods: They have called to
the witness stand exnert witnesses in the field
of psychology to testify as to the various factors
which may cause eyewitness identification to be
unreliable. They have also requested the trial
court to give a cautionary instruction stating
the factors to be considered by the jury in weighing
the credibility of eyewitness testimony. 635 P.Zd
at 1241.
In that case, the trial court refused to allow the defense to
take either of these actions.

Elizabeth Loftus, an expert on

eyewintess identification, was not allowed to testify and the
court refused to give the same instruction as appellant requested
in this case. 4 After a lengthy discussion on the use of expert
testimony to solve the problems associated with the eyewitness
testimony, the Kansas court stated,
After considering these cases and the literature
on the subject, we have concluded that requiring
trial courts to admit this tyoe of expert evidence
is not the answer to the problem. We believe that
the µroblem can be alleviated by a proper cautionary
instruction to the jury which sets forth the factors
to be considered in evaluating eyewitness testimony.
Such an instruction, coupled with vigorous crossexamination and persuasive argument by defense
counsel dealing realistically with the shortcomings
and trouble spots of the identification process,
should protect the rights of the defendant and
at the same time enable the courts to avoid the
problems involved in the admission of expert testimony
on this subject. 635 P.2d at 1243.

4.

See footnote l, supra.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The instruction that the Kansas court held should be
given was that framed by the United States Court of Appeal for
the District of Columbia in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d
552 (D.C. Cir., 1972) . 5

The Telfaire court described the need

for such an instruction, stating,
The presumption of innocence that safeguards
the common law system must be a premise that is
realized in instruct ion and not mere.ly a promise.
In pursuance of that objective, we have pointed
out the importance of and need for a special instruction
on the key issue of identification, which emphasizes
to the jury the need for finding that the circumstances
of the identification are convincing beyond a reasonable
doubt. This need was voiced in 1942 in McKenzie
v. United States, (126 F.2d 533] and it has been
given vitality in our opinions of recent years --·
following the Supreme Court's 1966 Wade-Gilbert
[v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18
L.Ed. 2d 1178 (1967)] Stovall [v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293} trilogy focusing on the very real danger of
mistaken identification as a threat to justice.
We refer to our post-Wade opinions in Gregory [v.
United States, 369 F.2d 185 (1966)] and Macklin
[v. United States, 409 F.2d 174 (1969)]. These
opinions sought to take into account the traditional
reco~nition that identification testimony presents
special problems of reliability by stressing the
importance of an identification instruction even
in- cases meeting the constitutional threshold of
admissibility.
[footnotes omitted] 469 F.2d at
555.
In State v. Warren, supra the court held that the model
instruction from the Telfaire case was more appropriate than
a general instruction dealing with an identification

5. This same instruction was cited with approval by Justice
Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. Malmrose, 649
P.2d 56 at 63 (Utah 1982), and as requested by ap~ellant in
this case.
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defense. 6

The Kansas court required the Telfaire instruction

be given, stating,

6.

The general instruction given in that case provided:

INSTRUCTION NO.
"It is for you to determine the weight and credit to
be given the testimony of each witness. You have a right to
use that knowledge and experience which you possess in common
with men in general in considering the testimony of each witness.
You also may take the following factors into consideration when
weighing a witness' testimony:
(a). The witness' ability and opportunity to observe
and know the things about which he had testified;

(b)

The clarity and accuracy of the witness' memory;

(c)

The witness' manner and conduct while testifying;

(d) Any interest the witness may have in the result
of the trial; and
(e) The reasonableness of the witness' testimony when
considered in light of all the evidence in the case; and
(f)
may have.

Any bias, interest, prejudice or motive the witness

If you find that any witness has wilfully testified falsely
concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust
the testimony of that witness in other matters, and you ~ay
reject all or part of the testimony of that witness, or you
may give it such weight as you think it deserves. You should
not reject any testimony without cause." 635 P.2d at 1245.

-10-
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. . we have considered the fact that trial courts
are often required to determine the admissibility
of eyewitness testimony where issues of unreliabilitv
are raised. As pointed out by Chief Justice Schroeder
in State v. Ponds, 227 Kan. 627, 608 P.2d 946,
in testing the reliability of identification testimony,
the five factors mentioned in Neil v. Biggers [490
U.S. 188 (1972)] should be considered by the trial
court. If these five factors should be considered
~n determining the admissibility of the testimony,
it would seem even more appropriate to require
the jury to consider the same factors in weighing
the credibility of t~e eyewitness identification
testimony. Otherwise the jury might reasonably
conclude that the admission of the evidence by
the trial court vouched for its reliability. We
think it clear that, in order to prevent potential
injustice, some standards must be provided the
jury so that the credibility of eyewitness identification
testimony can be intelligently and fairly weighed.
The giving of such an instruction will take only
a couple of minutes in trial time and will be well
worth it, if some future injustices can be avoided.
635 P.2d at 1244 [Emphasis by court]
In Neil v. Biggers, su?ra, the United States Supreme
Court was addressing the issue of the admissibility of eyewitness
identification evidence based on a showup procedure. 7 In determining
the admissibility of the evidence the court initially noted
that you must consider the totality of the circumstances.

The

court then listed several factors to consider, stating,
As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered
in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification
include the opportunity of the witness to view
the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness'
degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness!
prior description of the criminal, the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation,
and the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation. 409 U.S. at 199.

7. That orocedure involved two detectives walking the petitioner
past a rape victim.
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For these same reasons a number of other jurisdictions
have found that the model instruction f.rom United States v.
Telfaire, supra, should be given when warranted by the circumstances
of a particular case. 8

In Utah, the Telfaire instruction was cited with approval
by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v. Malmrose,
I

649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982).

In that case the majority opinion

did not squarely address the issue of the requirement of such
an instruction.

The court did not find reversible error in

the trial court's refusal to give the instruction.

The primary

reason the court gave for that holding was that defense counsel
failed to take exception to the trial court's refusal to give
the instruction.

The court then stated, "we have not heretofore

held that such an instruction is required.

We believe the giving

of it should be left to the discretion of the trial court'' 649
P.2d at 61.

Justice Stewart wrote a dissent to that oart of

the court's opinion and Justice Durham concurred in that dissent.

8. The Telfaire instruction specifically has either recommended
or approved for use in numerous jurisdictions as reflected by
the following cases: United States v. Holly, 502 F.2d 273 (4th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Hodges, 515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir.
1975); State v. Beniamin, 363 A. 2d 762 (Conn., 1976); State
v. Calia, 514 P.2d 354 (Or. App. 1973), cert. den. 417 U.S.
917 (1974); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E. Zd 889 (Mass.
1979); United States v. Kavanaugh, 572 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978);
United States v. Dodge, 538 F.Zd 770 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. den.,
429 U.S. 1099 (l977); United States v. Masterson, 529 F.2d
30 (9th Cir) cert. den., 426 U.S. 908 (l976); United States
v. O'Neal, 496 F.Zd 368 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Fernandez.
456
638 (2d Cir. 1972); State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St. 2d
·
269, 421 N.E. 2d 157 (1981); State v. Pa!Be, 280 S.E. 2d 72
CW. Va. 1981); United States v. Cueto, 6
F.2d 1273 (10th Cir.
1980); People v. Guzman, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69, 47 Cal. App. 3d
.'3 8 O ( Ca 1 . An p . , 1915 ) ; St ate v . Mote s , 2 15 S . E . 2 d 19 0 ( S . c . ,
1975); State v. Payne, 280 S.E. 2d 72 ('W. Va. 1981) ~·State v_
Malmrose, 649Sponsored
P.2d
56 (Utah 1982) (Stewart, J.
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Previously, this court had decided that it was not reversible
error to give an instruction similar to that given in State
v. Warren, supra, State v. Schaffer, 683 P.2d 1185 (Utah 1981).
It is interesting to note that State v. Schaffer, supra, was
not even cited in the Malmrose case.

In Schaffer the court

did not say there was no error in refusing to give the instruction,
but rather, the court reasoned that because other general instructions
on credibility and burden of proof were given, the jury was
adequately advised on what the law was.

Secondly, the court

noted that there were two eyewitnesses who had abundant opportunity
to observe the defendant, thus alleviating any prejudice.

The

court concluded that the refusal to give the instruction did
not constitute "reversible error" [emphasis added] 638 P.2d
at 1187.
Similarly in State v. Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Ut. 1980)
the issue of the refusal to give an instruction on eyewitness
identification was raised. 9 With respect to that issue this
court stated;
A criminal defendant is entitled to have a jury
instructed on his theory of the case if there is
any substantial evidence to justify such an instruction.
Where, however, the requested instruction is denied,
no prejudicial error occurs if it appears that
the giving of the requested instruction would not
have affected the outcome of the trial. Moreover,
a defendant is not entitled to an instruction which
is redundant or renetitive of nrinciples enunciated
in other instructi~ns given to~the jury. The principal
points of defendant's proposed instruction dealt
with the State's burden of proof and the factors
to consider in weighing the.testimony of an eyewitness.

9.

The text of the instruction was not included in the oninion.
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All of these factors were adequately dealt with
in other instructions presented to the jury by
the trial court. As a-result, we cannot agree
that the denial of the oroposed instruction constituted
reversible error. [footnote omitted] 622 P.2d
at 35 9.
The general conclusions that can be reached about these
cases are:

First of all, this court has never said that such

an instruction is improper and should not be given.

Secondly,

the court has clearly implied that under certain circumstances
the identity instruction would be proper.

Finally, the court

in all of these cases spoke in terms of no reversible error
indicating that due to the nature of the cases, even though
there may have been error, there was no prejudice to the appellants.
Several other principles of Utah law which were dealt
with only in passing or not mentioned at all in those cases
must be discussed here.

Under the law of Utah a criminal defendant

is entitled to have his theory of the case presented to the
jury in the form of written instructions, State v. Stenbeck,

78 U. 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931), State v. Mccumber, supra.

With

respect to defenses, a criminal defendant is entitled to have
the jury instructed that the defense need only raise a reasonable
doubt.

State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Ut.

1977); State v. Torres,

619 P.2d 694 (Ut. 1980); and State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Ut.
1981).

The mere fact that the court gave general instructions
.

on the presumption of innocence and burden of proof does not
alleviate the prejudice in refusing to instruct the jury with
respect to the defendant's burden in establishing his defense.

This court has held that a jury need not
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. . . go through such a tortuous process when
that result could have been achieved by giving
the defendant's requested instruction, or one of
that substance." State v. Torres, supra at 696.
In this case there was no instruction given which explained
to the jury what the defense was, nor was there any instruction
given which explained to the jury what the burden of oroof was with
respect to a defense.

The only instruction that was submitted

on these issues was that which is the subject of this appeal.lo
Consequently, it was error not to give an instruction explaining
to the jury what the defense was, and relating that portion
of the evidence to the reasonable doubt standard.

The policies

that support the giving of the Telfaire model instruction, discussed
above, are substantial and compelling.

That instruction is

clearly a necessary and proper one and it was error to refuse
to give it to the jury.
The error in refusing to give the instruction an identification
was preiudicial requiring a new trial.

A criminal conviction

must be reversed if there is a reasonable likelihood that the
verdict would be different if the requested instruction had
been given.

State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Ut. 1977).

The

only issue at trial was the identification of the defendant
as the perpetrator of the aggravated robbery.

The victim never

identified the appellant in court as the person who committed
the offense.

(T. 9-30).

The only identification that was made

of the appellant was from a photographic array that the victim

10.

See footnote 1, supra.
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observed some twelve days after the commission of the crime.
(T. 16, 36-38).

There was no other evidence to corroborate

the identification made by Mr. Palmer.

(See, United States

v. Cueto, supra; State v. Payne, supra).

The initial description

of the robber given by Mr. Palmer was very general.

He was

able to describe the clothing, height and weight of the perpetrator.
The only distinguishing features he noticed was that of a moustache
and dark brown, shoulder length hair.

(T. 33)

Mr. Palmer's

opportunity to observe the robber was very limited.

He stated

that the robber asked for change for a dollar prior to the offense
(T. 11).

That transaction as well as the opportunity to observe

lasted only a matter of seconds.

(T. 19)

The robber then reapproached

the window and put the gun through the hole in the window at
face level where he was able to observe only the gun.

(T. 22)

The fact that Mr. Palmer was able to observe only the gun is
born out by the detailed description that he gave of it.

He

stated that it was a .22 caliber revolver with an eight inch
barrell.

(T. 11)

Finally, it is important to note that the

officer who observed Mr. Palmer immediately after the robbery
found him to be obviously upset and very badly scared

(T. 34).

It is hard to imagine a case where there would be a greater
need for an instruction describing what eyewitness identification
evidence is, how it is to be evaluated, and the burden of proof
it must meet.

In rejecting this instruction requested by the

appellant the trial court noted on the instruction "not given
use as argument".

(R. 66)

However. the court also instructed
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the jury that "statements of counsel are not evidence and should
not be considered as such by you".

CR. 34)

There were obvious

problems in this case with respect to the opportunity to observe,
the potential for suggestive procedures with photogra?hic identification,
the state of mind of Mr. Palmer at the time the observations
were made and the complete absence of any evidence to corroborate
the identification of the defendant.

An instruction on how

to evaluate eyewitness identification evidence and how to weigh
the evidence was necessary to inform the jury of these problems.

If the instruction had been given, there is a reasonable likelihood
that the verdict would have been different.

Consequently, the

error was prejudicial and a new trial should be ordered.
CONCLUSION
The only evidence connecting the appellant to the aggravated
robbery which is the subject of this case, was the identification
made of the appellant from a photographic array.

The dangers

inherent in eyewitness identification evidence have been recognized
for many years.

One of the methods that courts have required

to be used to eliminate some of these dangers is to give the
jury an instruction that describes the nature of identification
evidence, factors to be considered in weighing such evidence
and the burden of proof that evidence must meet.

Such an instruction

was requested here and the refusal to give it was prejudicial
error requiring a new trial.
I
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Delivered a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
day of December, 1982.

\

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

